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WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 
Volume 41 2019 Issue 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—I BEG YOUR PARDON: EX 
PARTE GARLAND OVERRULED; THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON 
IS NO LONGER UNLIMITED 
Zachary J. Broughton 
President Trump’s August 2017 pardon of Joseph Arpaio for his 
contempt of court conviction raised the constitutional question of 
whether there are any limitations to the president’s pardoning power.  In 
the 1867 seminal case, Ex parte Garland, the Supreme Court opined that 
the president is the only person who can limit the pardon power, and that 
a pardon can be issued before, during, or after conviction.  Since the late 
1800s, however, several cases handed down by the Supreme Court have, 
in some way, identified a limitation to the pardon power.  Therefore, this 
Note argues that the president’s pardon power is limited, and that 
Garland’s statement of a plenary pardon power has been overruled. 
INTRODUCTION  
On August 29, 2017, President Donald Trump announced on Twitter 
that he was pardoning former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio of Maricopa County, 
Arizona, for Arpaio’s contempt of court conviction a month earlier in 
United States v. Arpaio.1  President Trump’s ability to pardon Arpaio 
 
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law (2019); B.A. and 
M.Ed., University of Massachusetts Amherst (2014 & 2016); and Editor-in-Chief of the 
Western New England Law Review.  I would like to thank Dean Sudha Setty for her 
exceptional guidance and feedback throughout the drafting of this Note.  A thank you to 
Professor Bruce Miller whose mentorship inspired this Note.  A huge thank you for the 
unconditional love of my mother, Michelle Broughton; my uncle, Jean Viel; my grandmother, 
Toni Viel; and my love, Lauren Erickson.  And a thank you to my fellow staff for their 
diligent efforts throughout the entire production process. 
1. United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 3268180, at *7 
(D. Ariz. July 31, 2017); Jennifer Rubin, Legal Challenge to Arpaio Pardon Begins, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/08/30/legal-
challenge-to-arpaio-pardon-begins/?utm_term=.010014cb18c3 [https://perma.cc/56KP-VS9J].  
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derives from Article II of the Constitution.2  This action served as 
President Trump’s first pardon since taking office in January 2017—an 
uncharacteristic move given that pardons are often issued at the end of a 
president’s term.3 
The issuance of Arpaio’s pardon reignited a 250-year-old 
constitutional debate about the purpose and limits of the president’s 
pardon power, and—in a much larger context—the effects it has on the 
separation and balance of powers.4  Since August 2017, numerous amici 
 
The case derives from a 2011 court order instructing Arpaio and his department to “refrain from 
racially profiling Latinos during patrols and turning them over to federal immigration 
authorities.”  Melissa Etehad, Joe Arpaio, Former Sheriff in Arizona, Is Found Guilty of 
Criminal Contempt, L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2017, 5:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-joe-arpaio-verdict-20170706-story.html [https://perma.cc/ET8U-CJ3R].  Arpaio’s civil 
contempt charge, adjudicated by district court Judge G. Murray Snow of Arizona, arose from 
the Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio case.  Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 994 
(D. Ariz. 2011).  Melendres filed a civil suit against Arpaio in 2007, arguing that the Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Department targeted Latinos “with the presumption that they entered the 
country illegally.”  Laura Gómez, This Man’s Arrest Helped Bring Down Joe Arpaio.  Manuel 
Melendres Speaks Publicly, AZCENTRAL (Dec. 26, 2016, 6:22 AM), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2016/12/26/phoenix-arrest-manuel-
melendres-joe-arpaio-profiling-lawsuit/95041534/ [https://perma.cc/WT7C-DUMZ].  The 
2007 suit came after Melendres was pulled over for speeding, ordered to hand over his 
immigration paperwork, told he does not belong in the United States, arrested, questioned for 
many hours, and then deemed to be a legal immigrant by an Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agent.  Id.; see Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012). 
2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The president] shall have Power to Grant Reprieves 
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”). 
3. Adam Liptak, Why Trump’s Pardon of Arpaio Follows Law, Yet Challenges It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/us/politics/trump-pardon-joe-
arpaio-constitution.html.  Since pardoning Arpaio, President Trump has exercised his Article II 
power to pardon or commute prison sentences of at least eight other individuals.  See George 
Petras, President Trump’s Pardons and Commutations, USA TODAY (July 10, 2018, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/07/10/president-trumps-pardons-and-
commutations/771796002/.  Since the issuance of the pardon, it has been upheld by the district 
court.  Criminal Minutes at 1, United States v. Arpaio, No. 2:16-cr-01012 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 
2017), BL No. 243.  The district court also denied Arpaio’s motion for vacatur.  See Clerk Order 
at 1, United States v. Arpaio, No. 17-10448 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2017), BL No. 4 (“A review of 
the record suggests that this court may lack jurisdiction over the appeal because the district 
court’s order . . . denying appellant’s motion for vacatur and dismissal with prejudice is not 
appealable as a final judgment . . . .”).  The progress of Arpaio’s case remains relevant to the 
discussion, purpose, and goals of this Note.  While the case was appealed specifically due to the 
denial of vacatur, the Ninth Circuit, and potentially the Supreme Court, thereafter, could 
complete a full analysis of the pardon because without the presidential pardon Arpaio would 
not be in a position to pursue vacatur. 
4. See Scott Ingram, Presidents, Politics, and Pardons: Washington’s Original (Mis?)Use 
of the Pardon Power, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 259, 260–66 (2018); see also Genevieve 
A. Bentz, A Blank Check: Constitutional Consequences of President Trump’s Arpaio Pardon, 
11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 250, 250 (2018); Laura Palacios, The Presidential Pardon Power: 
Interpreting Its Scope and Enacting an Effective Solution to Limit Its Potential for Abuse, 40 T. 
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have written to both the district court in Arizona and the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, arguing that Arpaio’s pardon went well beyond the 
limitations prescribed by both the Constitution and the Supreme Court.5 
In Ex parte Garland, one of the first cases to address the scope of the 
pardon, the Court proclaimed the pardon to be “unlimited, with the 
exception [of impeachment].  It extends to every offence known to the law 
and may be exercised at any time after its commission . . . .”6  Since 
Garland, the Court has further defined the reach and, as this Note argues, 
the limitations of the president’s pardon authority.7  Despite Garland’s 
centuries old ruling, to allow the president to exercise a plenary pardon, 
unchecked by the other branches, frustrates and threatens the balance and 
separation of powers8—an often celebrated and revered staple of 
American democracy. 
 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 209, 214–31 (2018) (reviewing the history and scholarship relating to the 
pardon). 
5. See [Proposed] Memorandum of Amici Curiae Certain Members of Congress in 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Vacatur and Dismissal With Prejudice at 6, United States 
v. Arpaio, No. 2:16-cr-01012 (D. Ariz. Oct. 05, 2017), BL No. 239 (“An absolute, unqualified 
presidential power to pardon would be an impediment to the constitutional duty of the Judiciary 
to do justice and would conflict with the function of the courts.”); Proposed Brief of Amicus 
Curiae The Protect Democracy Project, Inc. at 2, United States v. Arpaio, No. 2:16-cr-01012 
(D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2017), BL No. 228 [hereinafter Protect Democracy Project] (“[Arpaio’s 
pardon] violates the due process of law at the heart of the Constitution as well as core separation 
of powers features of the Constitution.”); [Proposed] Amicus Brief of Roderick and Solange 
MacArthur Justice Center in Opposition to Arpaio’s Motion to Vacate Conviction at 1, United 
States v. Arpaio, No. 2:16-cr-01012 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2017), BL No. 223 [hereinafter 
Roderick] (“This Court should deny Joseph Arpaio’s motion to vacate his conviction.  The 
pardon is invalid and unconstitutional because it has the purpose and effect of eviscerating the 
judicial power to enforce constitutional rights.”).  See generally [Proposed] Memorandum of 
Amici Curiae Erwin Chemerinsky et al., United States v. Arpaio, No. 2:16-cr-01012 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 11, 2017), BL No. 230 (arguing the pardon is void because Arpaio’s contempt does not 
constitute an offense against the United States). 
6. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
7. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (“[S]ome minimal 
procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings.  Judicial intervention might, for example, 
be warranted . . . .”); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“[P]ardon 
and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are 
rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264 
(1974) (“[It] is inescapable that the pardoning power was intended to include the power to 
commute sentences on conditions which do not in themselves offend the Constitution, but which 
are not specifically provided for by statute.”); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 115 (1925) 
(“Nothing in the ordinary meaning of the words ‘offenses against the United States’ excludes 
criminal contempt[].”); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915) (“Granting, then, that 
the pardon was legally issued . . . it was Burdick’s right to refuse it . . . and it, therefore, [did] 
not becom[e] effective . . . .”); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) (“[The pardon] 
cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United States . . . .”). 
8. Infra Part III. 
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As it stands, the case of Arpaio represents one pardon out of many 
more to come, as signaled by the president himself.9  With President 
Trump and several of his associates currently under investigation for 
alleged ties to Russian operatives,10 the idea that more pardons are coming 
does not seem too farfetched.  What is more, several of President Trump’s 
closest associates have already been indicted or convicted of lying to 
investigators, committing fraud, and conspiring against the United 
States.11  In response, President Trump has proclaimed he has the 
“absolute right” to pardon himself.12  Such a belief posits a new 
constitutional and public policy reality: not since the unchartered territory 
that was the Watergate scandal has the need to understand the depth of the 
president’s pardon power been more important.13 
Notwithstanding the arguments of Arpaio and President Trump’s 
tweets, the president’s pardon authority is limited.  This Note proceeds in 
several parts to argue that, since 1867, the Supreme Court has issued 
several opinions that, together, overrule Garland’s holding and render the 
presidential pardon a limited power.  Part I reviews the historical 
background of the pardon power, its origin, its evolution, and how it has 
been used in the United States.  Part II parses through seven Supreme 
Court cases that collectively overrule Garland.14  Finally, Part III 
contextualizes the presidential pardon in the overall separation of powers 
debate, arguing that the Supreme Court has exercised and should continue 
to exercise its authority to review presidential pardons. 
 
9. Kaitlan Collins, Exclusive: Trump Considers Dozens of New Pardons, CNN: POLITICS 
(June 6, 2018, 4:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/politics/donald-trump-pardons/
index.html [https://perma.cc/94K3-KWA8]. 
10. Rebecca R. Ruiz & Mark Landler, Robert Mueller, Former F.B.I. Director, Is Named 
Special Counsel for Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/politics/robert-mueller-special-counsel-russia-
investigation.html [https://perma.cc/GS7F-AYKY]. 
11. Frances Kerry et al., Factbox: People Indicted, Convicted, Investigated in Trump-
Russia Probe, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2018, 6:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
trump-russia-aides-factbox/factbox-people-indicted-convicted-investigated-in-trump-russia-
probe-idUSKCN1LN2OJ [https://perma.cc/7XFP-ZKBA]. 
12. Abigail Simon, President Trump Says He Can Pardon Himself.  Most Voters 
Disagree, TIME (June 13, 2018), http://time.com/5311182/donald-trump-self-pardon-poll/ 
[https://perma.cc/9VH4-7URJ]. 
13. See infra Part I. 
14. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998); Conn. Bd. of 
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264 (1974); 
Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485 (1927); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 87 (1915); 
Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 161 
(1833). 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKDROP 
One of the most well-known presidential pardons in American history 
was issued on September 8, 1974, when President Gerald Ford granted 
former President Richard Nixon “a full, free, and absolute pardon . . . for 
all offenses against the United States which he . . . ha[d] committed or 
may have committed.”15  President Nixon’s pardon is one of over 14,000 
pardons issued since President William McKinley in 1900.16  By issuing 
the pardon, President Ford utilized his authority to effectuate the 
Constitution’s mechanism for granting executive mercy, a power designed 
at the 1787 Constitutional Convention by the Committee on Detail 
(“Committee”).17 
When the Committee convened,18 the notion of affording the 
Executive Branch the power to grant pardons and commutations was not 
a novel idea; similar powers had been exercised for thousands of years in 
some areas including Athens, Rome, and England.19  Once the Committee 
finalized the language establishing the president’s pardon authority, it was 
approved by the Convention and submitted to the states for ratification.20 
This section of the Note contains several subparts that discuss the 
origin of the pardon power coming from Athens, Rome, and England and 
its introduction at the 1787 Constitutional Convention; pardons issued 
since 1789, starting with President George Washington; and the Garland 
decision, followed by other important cases affecting the president’s 
pardon power. 
A. The Pardon Power of Ancient Athens and Rome 
Most scholarship discussing the origin of the pardon focuses on its 
roots in common law and its eventual adoption in pre-colonial America.21  
 
15. President Gerald Ford’s Pardon of Richard Nixon, CNN: ALL POL. (Jun. 17, 1997), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/gen/resources/watergate/ford.speech.html 
[https://perma.cc/9A5K-L9N4]. 
16. See Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-
statistics [https://perma.cc/P25Y-9F6M]. 
17. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 185 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
1974) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
18. Id. 
19. See Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A 
Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 201–05 (1999). 
20. See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Nature of a Pardon Under the United States 
Constitution, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 36, 49–54 (1978). 
21. See Leonard B. Boudin, The Presidential Pardons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. 
Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon Power Been Exceeded?, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 9–
10 (1976); Buchanan, supra note 20, at 50; William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: 
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However, surveying the tradition of pardons in Athens, Rome, and 
England sheds light on how such practices influenced the 1787 
Constitutional Convention.22 
The way in which we view the president’s pardon power today is not 
how it once existed in Athens, “primarily due to the nature of a pure 
democracy that was the foundation of the governmental structure.”23  The 
Athenians designed a mechanism for clemency, often referred to as the 
Adeia process, which absolved an individual convicted of public crimes 
or treason, provided he or she received 6,000 votes from fellow citizens.24  
Despite the Adeia process, records reflect difficulty in attaining the votes 
needed;25 thus, individuals most likely to receive clemency were powerful 
figures with well-known names and reputations, including athletes and 
orators.  Because of the difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of 
votes, there are only a few pardons recorded in Greek history.26  Such a 
reality suggests that popularity and celebrity were more influential than 
fairness or justice in determining whether an individual could receive a 
pardon.27 
 
A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 497 (1977); Scott P. Johnson & 
Christopher E. Smith, White House Scandals and the Presidential Pardon Power: Persistent 
Risks and Prospects for Reform, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 907, 908–09 (1999); Daniel T. Kobil, 
The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
569, 590 (1991) [hereinafter Wresting the Pardoning Power]; Hugh C. Macgill, The Nixon 
Pardon: Limits on the Benign Prerogative, 7 CONN. L. REV. 56, 63 (1974); Todd David 
Peterson, Congressional Power over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow 
of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 1227–32 (2003); Richard A. 
Saliterman, Commentary, Reflections on the Presidential Clemency Power, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 
257, 259 (1985); Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and 
Accountability in the Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1113, 1126 (1989); Ashley M. 
Steiner, Remission of Guilt or Removal of Punishment?  The Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 
46 EMORY L.J. 959, 964–65 (1997). 
22. See Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 583–89; Nida & Spiro, supra 
note 19, at 201–09 (reviewing how the pardon was used). 
23. Nida & Spiro, supra note 19, at 201 & n.16. 
24. Id. at 201–02 (citing Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 583). 
25. See 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE 
PROCEDURES 9 (1939) [hereinafter RELEASE PROCEDURES]. 
26. See Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 583. 
Only a few pardons of individuals are recorded in Greek history: the recall of 
Alcibiades in 408 B.C., the pardon of Demosthenes in 323 B.C., and the recall of 
Thucydides, the historian.  Professor MacDowell also recounts the pardon of 
Dorieus, a Rhodian athlete who had been condemned to death, because it was 
thought to be a pity that a man of such athletic prowess should be brought to so 
low. 
Id. at 583 n.79 (citation omitted). 
27. See id. 
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The pardon-clemency process utilized in Athens was similar to the 
one employed by the Romans insofar as neither system was designed to 
promote or achieve fairness or justice.28  Rome’s use of the pardon was, 
in many cases, exercised to achieve a political end.  For example, after 
hearing the chanting request of the Jewish people, Pontius Pilate pardoned 
Barabbas.29  Pilate did so in order to quell the surmounting discord among 
his subjects who were calling for his release.30  Another example of 
Rome’s politically motivated use of the pardon was to discipline mutinous 
troops by killing every tenth soldier instead of killing entire groups of 
wrongdoers.31  Such a practice allowed Rome to prevent revolt, while also 
conserving assets useful to the empire.32  The Romans also employed the 
pardon in pursuit of patriotic ends.  This is demonstrated by the pardoning 
of Horatio for murdering his sister, who “‘bewail[ed]’ the death of a foe 
of Rome to whom she was betrothed,” while failing to mourn her deceased 
Roman brothers.33 
Many of the pardons from Athens and Rome illustrate a clemency 
process driven by celebrity status and a desire to maintain power and 
control.34  These exercises of the pardon power survived the fall of both 
the Greek and Roman empires and were given new life in England. 
 
28. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 16–17 (1989). 
29. John 18:38–40 (King James). 
Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?  And when he had said this, he went out again 
unto the Jews, and saith unto them, I find in him no fault at all.  But ye have a 
custom, that I should release unto you one at the passover: will ye therefore that I 
release unto you the King of the Jews?  Then cried they all again, saying, Not this 
man, but Barabbas. 
Id.  This passage reviews Pilate’s personal struggle and desire not to release Barabbas, a 
convicted criminal.  However, facing a large group of passionate and oppressed people, Pilate 
made an arguably calculated political decision to grant their request—as acting in the alternative 
would have been met with significant opposition.  See 1 RAYMOND E. BROWN, THE DEATH OF 
THE MESSIAH: FROM GETHSEMANE TO THE GRAVE 814 (1994). 
30. MOORE, supra note 28.  Pontius Pilate was the Governor of Judaea and constantly 
encountered riotous behavior from those he oppressed: the Jews.  See Pontius Pilate: Governor 
of Judaea, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pontius-
Pilate [https://perma.cc/SSJ6-7GT8].  Pilate “wanted to remain on good terms with the Jewish 
authorities” in order to keep control.  Randall Balmer, Killing Jesus: Who Was the Real Pontius 
Pilate?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/books/review/
pontius-pilate-aldo-schiavone.html. 
31. MOORE, supra note 28. 
32. See id. 
33. Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 584–85, 585 n.86. 
34. Id. at 584–85. 
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B. The Pardon Power of the Pre-Colonial English Monarch 
The development and use of the pardon power by the English 
monarch was viewed through different lenses—some saw it as a 
mechanism for the king to consolidate the monarch’s power,35 while 
others viewed it as a way to ensure that justice was mercifully 
administered.36  To complicate matters, all throughout England’s history, 
the monarch was in direct competition with other entities that exercised a 
similar pardon power, including the clergy, great earls, and the feudal 
courts.37  However, this competition over the power to grant pardons 
ended when the pardon became formally centralized in the monarch—
after Parliament gave King Henry VIII the sole power “to pardon or remit 
treasons, murders, manslaughters, felonies, or outlawries.”38  One famous 
use of this power was Henry VIII’s alteration of Sir Thomas More’s 
punishment; instead of being hanged and disemboweled alive, his original 
sentence for treason, More was decapitated.39 
Eventually, limitations were placed on the monarch’s pardon power.  
For example, the monarch could not impair the rights of third parties 
seeking reparations from wrongdoers.40  The monarch was also required 
to specifically identify the crime for which the offender was receiving 
clemency,41 especially if it involved treason, murder, or rape.42 
The monarch’s near-absolute pardon power survived for 
approximately 165 years, until a conflict arose over whether King Charles 
II could use that power to overrule Parliament’s impeachment of Thomas 
Osborne, the Lord High Treasurer of England.43  At the direction of 
Charles II, Osborne secretly offered France neutrality for the price of 
 
35. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 233 
(1797) (“Mercy and truth preserve the king, and by clemency is his throne strengthened.”); 
Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 586 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *388) (“[A]cts of clemency ‘endear the sovereign to his subjects, and 
contribute more than any thing to root in their hearts that filial affection, and personal loyalty, 
which are the sure establishment of a prince.’”). 
36. BLACKSTONE, supra note 35. 
37. Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 51, 55 (1963). 
38. Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 586. 
39. Thomas Howell, The Trial of Sir Thomas More, Knight, in 1 A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 386, 394 (1816). 
40. See Duker, supra note 21, at 486. 
41. BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *400. 
42. RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 25, at 135. 
43. See Duker, supra note 21, at 487–95. 
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“600,000 livres,” a move contrary to Parliament’s desire.44  Prior to 
impeachment, Osborne received a “royal pardon.”45  Believing Charles II 
had gone beyond his power, Parliament considered measures aimed at 
limiting his pardon capabilities.46 
Parliament acted forthwith to diminish the monarch’s pardon 
power.47  Specifically, Parliament enacted the following legislation: the 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, prohibiting clemency for individuals 
convicted of causing others to become imprisoned outside England; the 
1689 Bill of Rights eliminated the monarch’s former power to suspend 
operation of laws or disregard its execution; the 1701 Act of Settlement 
removed the pardon as a bar to impeachment; and in 1721, Parliament 
established its own power.48  Despite such legislation, the monarch 
continued to exercise the pardon power—often to win over key clerics and 
nobles—while failing to save those wrongly sentenced to death.49  Such 
practices led to widespread criticism of the royal pardon.50  
Notwithstanding Parliament’s attack on the monarch, English courts 
regularly held the monarch’s pardon power to be absolute.51 
Eventually, the monarch’s pardon power was introduced to the 
American colonies by way of the royal governors, who, through their 
charters, were granted substantial pardon authority.52  However, after the 
Revolutionary War, the task of creating a new government lay before the 
 
44. See id. at 488. 
45. 1 ANDREW BROWNING, THOMAS OSBORNE, FIRST EARL OF DANBY AND DUKE OF 
LEEDS: 1632-1712 324–25 (1951). 
46. See Duker, supra note 21, at 491–94. 
47. Grupp, supra note 37, at 56–58; Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 
587–88. 
48. See sources cited supra note 47. 
49. See RELEASE PROCEDURES, supra note 25, at 30; NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING’S 
PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307, at vii–viii (1969). 
50. Leslie Sebba, Clemency in Perspective, in CRIMINOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF ISRAEL DRAPKIN 221, 225–28 (Simha F. Landau & Leslie Sebba eds., 1977). 
51. See Godden v. Hales (1686) 89 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1050–51. 
[T]he Kings of England were absolute Sovereigns; . . . the laws were the King’s 
laws; . . . the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government as 
he saw necessity for it; . . . he was sole judge of that necessity; . . . no Act of 
Parliament could take away that power . . . . 
Id. at 1051. 
52. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3801 (Francis Thorpe ed., 1909) (reviewing the 
Virginia Colony charter); Duker, supra note 21, at 497–501 (reviewing the charters of several 
other colonies). 
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American people, and so did the opportunity to reimagine an executive 
pardon. 
C. To the Convention of 1787 and Beyond 
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Committee on 
Detail was charged with designing the presidential pardon.53  However, 
despite this responsibility, “the Framers ‘did [not] devote extended debate 
to [the] meaning [of the Pardon Clause].’”54  Instead, throughout the brief 
drafting process, Charles Pickney, Alexander Hamilton, and John 
Rutledge led the effort to include a pardon power solely vested in the 
president.55 
Critics feared an unchecked and unfettered pardon would result in 
abuse,56 while Hamilton argued against legislative involvement with the 
pardon, believing that the reasons for, and benefits of, vesting the pardon 
with the president outweighed concerns of legislative exclusion.57  
Hamilton further argued that the presidential pardon was a mechanism for 
furthering public policy goals, such that “in seasons of insurrection or 
rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a [well-timed] offer of 
pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility . . . .  The 
dilatory process of convening the legislature . . . would frequently be the 
occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity.”58  Hamilton’s argument 
not only reflects his overall desire for a strong executive, but also the 
notion that it would be far more expedient for one person to make a 
decision, rather than a representative body.59 
Additionally, Hamilton believed “[t]he criminal code of every 
country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy 
access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a 
countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”60  Meaning, the presidential 
pardon power enables the president to take into consideration that which 
 
53. See Peterson, supra note 21, at 1229. 
54. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 9 TEX. L. REV. 561, 
565 n.19 (2001) (alterations in original) (quoting Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974)); 
see Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 590 (“[F]ew reported exchanges at the 
Convention concern[ed] the clemency power . . . .”). 
55. See Duker, supra note 21, at 501. 
56. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 20 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
58. Id. 
59. See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CAL. 
L. REV. 1665, 1674–75 (2001). 
60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Congress cannot foresee—“the particularities of every crime and the 
circumstances of every offender.”61  Due to Hamilton’s zealous support, 
and that of his federalist brethren, the first draft of the pardon power read: 
“He [the President] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but 
his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an Impeachment.”62 
Despite Hamilton’s arguments, some members of the Convention 
suggested modifications.  Roger Sherman of Connecticut proposed 
language that would empower the president “to grant reprieves until the 
ensuing session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate,”63 
but a Committee vote defeated this proposal.64  A motion to include the 
words “except in cases of impeachment” and to remove the phrase “but 
his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar” was approved by the 
Convention.65  Luther Martin tried to insert the words “after conviction,” 
but was persuaded otherwise in favor of the idea that a pardon pre-
conviction could be helpful in some circumstances.66  Finally, Edmund 
Randolph tried to insert a limitation to the pardon power by excluding 
“cases of treason,” but his amendment failed.67 
At the conclusion of the Convention, the presidential pardon was 
approved, using the same language still employed today.68  After 
ratification of the Constitution in June of 1788,69 the pardon power 
became a staple of the American presidency, beginning with President 
George Washington. 
D. The Pardon’s Constitutional Development 
The early uses of the pardon were primarily for granting mercy.70  
Washington was the first to exercise this Article II power when he 
pardoned leaders of the Whiskey Rebellion who, in 1795, “were accused 
 
61. Krent, supra note 59. 
62. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17. 
63. Id. at 419. 
64. Id. n.15. 
65. 5 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 
THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 480 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827). 
66. See id. 
67. Id. at 549. 
68. Compare Hoffstadt, supra note 54, with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
69. Observing Constitution Day, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/
lessons/constitution-day/ratification.html [https://perma.cc/2REC-LL44] (discussing the order 
in which states voted for the Constitution and that after New Hampshire became the ninth state 
to do so, the Constitution then became ratified). 
70. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 311 (1855) (“A pardon is said . . . to be a work of 
mercy . . . .”). 
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of tarring and feathering officials attempting to collect a new federal 
tax . . . on whiskey.”71  These pardons came after Washington spent 
several years engaged in dialogue and negotiations with the rebellion’s 
leadership in an ongoing attempt to quell the riotous behavior that 
ensued.72  Despite referring to one of the leaders as being “a little short of 
an idiot,” Washington thought the government’s responsibility was to 
show mercy.73  After the pardons, Washington explained his actions to 
Congress: 
The misled have abandoned their errors . . . .  For though I shall 
always think it a sacred duty to exercise with firmness and energy the 
constitutional powers with which I am vested, yet it appears to me no 
less consistent with the public good than it is with my personal feelings 
to mingle in the operations of Government every degree of moderation 
and tenderness which the national justice, dignity, and safety may 
permit.74 
Washington’s actions and remarks to Congress demonstrated a process 
geared towards patience, restraint, sympathy, and mercy. 
After Washington left office, most of his forty-four successors 
exercised their Article II pardon power.75  Similar to Washington, 
President John Adams tried to put an end to the Pennsylvania Whiskey 
Rebellions by issuing pardons because “it [had] become unnecessary for 
the public good that any future prosecutions should be commenced.”76 
President Thomas Jefferson issued pardons to individuals 
incarcerated pursuant to the Alien and Sedition Acts.77  Jefferson believed 
the Acts were unconstitutional because their primary purpose was to stifle 
political opposition by precluding critical comments of the federal 
government, all in an effort to silence and defeat the Jeffersonian 
 
71. Nida & Spiro, supra note 19, at 207. 
72. See Carrie Hagen, The First Presidential Pardon Pitted Alexander Hamilton Against 
George Washington, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
history/first-presidential-pardon-pitted-hamilton-against-george-washington-180964659/ 
[https://perma.cc/PE7C-6BHN]. 
73. JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH, THE AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE 452–53 (1966). 
74. Hagen, supra note 72. 
75. See P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Lacking in Mercy: Least Merciful Presidents, PARDON POWER 
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.pardonpower.com/2014/09/lacking-in-mercy.html 
[https://perma.cc/6TS5-SAPG]. 
76. Amnesty—Power of the President, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 330, 343 (1892). 
77. Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 837 (2015) (citing Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic 
Presidential Pardons, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 139, 143 (2001)). 
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Republicans in future elections.78  When Jefferson pardoned those 
punished by the Acts, it appeared he showed mercy in order to counteract 
the type of government action he and his contemporaries fought against 
during the Revolution.79  However, some scholars later questioned 
Jefferson’s reasons for executing these pardons because, shortly 
thereafter, Jefferson remained relatively quiet when popular Federalists 
were eventually “prosecuted for seditiously libeling the United States and 
Jefferson.”80  Jefferson’s conduct may have signaled a shift in the use of 
the pardon power toward political, rather than merciful ends—a shift that 
would remain in effect for two hundred years.81 
E. Cry Havoc and Let Slip the Dogs of War: Using the Pardon During 
Armed Conflict 
During the military conflicts of the nineteenth century, several 
presidents employed the pardon—some in an effort to strengthen their 
ability to win the conflict and to achieve national healing and unity.82  This 
was especially true for Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, 
both during and after the American Civil War.83 
During the Civil War, it was common for Lincoln to issue pardons to 
individuals who either deserted their post in the Union Army—seeking to 
escape the perils of war—or to those who renounced their commitment to 
the Confederacy.84  Two years after the war began, Lincoln issued a 
 
78. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (July 22, 1804), in 11 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 43–44 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (“I ‘liberated a 
wretch who was suffering for a libel against Mr. Adams.’”); Steiner, supra note 21, at 959–60.  
The Supreme Court noted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that the Acts’ constitutionality was 
never tested.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
79. See Wresting the Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 592–93. 
80. Id. at 593 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER 
SIDE 163 (1963)). 
81. See infra Section I.E. (highlighting instances where presidents received significant 
political benefits after exercising their pardon power). 
82. Jonathan T. Menitove, The Problematic Presidential Pardon: A Proposal for 
Reforming Federal Clemency, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 452 (2009) (“[T]he President’s 
ability to pardon federal offenders swiftly has helped to heal the nation and serve the public 
interest.”); P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development, 
and Analysis (1900-1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 254 (1997) [hereinafter Executive 
Clemency]. 
83. Menitove, supra note 82, at 452. 
84. See Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 593, 598 & n.28 (2012).  During the Civil War, Lincoln issued approximately 
343 pardons.  P.S. RUCKMAN, JR., FEDERAL EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN UNITED STATES, 1789-
1995: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1995), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2214593 [https://perma.cc/69TD-BND9]. 
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general amnesty to those who rebelled against the Union.85  Lincoln’s 
proclamation provided that “upon taking an oath of allegiance, [a rebel 
would receive] ‘a full pardon . . . with restoration of all rights of property, 
except as to slaves, and in property cases where rights of third parties shall 
have intervened.’”86  Unlike other presidents, Lincoln often invited pardon 
petitioners to the White House,87 a ritual typically performed after the 
issuance of a pardon. 
After ascending to the presidency upon the assassination of Lincoln, 
Andrew Johnson continued down the path of granting mercy via the 
pardon.88  Johnson established what this Note will refer to as an exemption 
test in which former Confederate soldiers could participate in order to 
obtain a pardon.89  The limitations on who could be pardoned was 
primarily based on their net worth and their role in the Civil War.90 
Within a matter of weeks, Johnson began to systematically 
disassemble Congress’s reconstruction efforts by granting a vast number 
of pardons to former Confederates.91  Despite Johnson’s test, by the end 
of the summer in 1867, he had granted nearly 15,000 pardons, “effectively 
restoring the political status of the planter elite who had dominated 
 
85. Peterson, supra note 21, at 1241. 
86. See Brief of Professor Edward A. Hartnett as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 4, Patchak v. Zink, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018) (No. 16-498), BL No. 31 (quoting 
Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737, 737 (Dec. 8, 1863)). 
87. Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1177 (2010).  Of note, in 1865, just after the conclusion of the Civil War, 
Congress allocated funds to hire a pardon clerk, who would assist the Attorney General in 
reviewing clemency and pardon petitions.  Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: 
Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 286–87 (2013).  Prior to 
the Civil War, the system for applying for, reviewing, and receiving a pardon was relatively 
informal; usually judges would urge the president to intervene.  See George Lardner, Jr. & 
Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in 
Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 212, 212–14 (2004).  After a steady, yearly 
increase in pardon applications and issuances, in 1891, Congress decided to establish the Office 
of the Pardon Attorney in order to assist the president.  Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, 
Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1483, 1489 & n.26 (2000) [hereinafter Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons]. 
88. See Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. 
& C.L. 253, 309–10 (2010). 
89. JONATHAN T. DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON: THE 
RESTORATION OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, 1861-1898 339, 
343–44 (1953). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 135, 141–42, 161, 340. 
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antebellum Southern society.”92  Johnson also pardoned approximately 
60,000 Confederate military prisoners, more than 180,000 civilians who 
signed a loyalty oath, and former Confederate President Jefferson Davis 
on Christmas Day in 1868.93  Congress became disenchanted with 
Johnson’s lenient pardoning polices; thus it sought to curtail his pardon 
power through legislation.94 
Presidents in the post-Reconstruction era transitioned from granting 
general pardons to masses of citizens—save for draft-dodgers of the 
Vietnam War95—to evaluating pardons more case-by-case.96  The last fifty 
years witnessed the pardoning of individuals with whom presidents had a 
personal connection, including Gerald Ford,97 George H. W. Bush,98 Bill 
Clinton,99 George W. Bush,100 and now Donald Trump.101  With thousands 
of pardons issued, the Supreme Court has had a number of opportunities 
 
92. Morison, supra note 88, at 310.  “These applicants included such legal luminaries 
as . . . John Campbell, a former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who resigned at 
the outbreak of the war and served as the Confederate Assistant Secretary of War.”  Id. n.275. 
93. DORRIS, supra note 89, at 135, 141–42, 161, 311; Morison, supra note 88, at 310–11. 
94. See Duker, supra note 21, at 514–15.  Congress’s actions and the Supreme Court’s 
response will be addressed later in this Note.  Infra Section I.F. 
95. See Andrew Glass, Carter Pardons Draft Dodgers Jan. 21, 1977, POLITICO (Jan. 
21, 2008, 3:56 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2008/01/carter-pardons-draft-dodgers-jan-
21-1977-007974 [https://perma.cc/Q54B-P2QJ].  See generally Saliterman, supra note 21 
(discussing Saliterman’s clemency board experience where he assessed applications relating to 
Vietnam). 
96. See Krent, supra note 59, at 1674–76. 
97. See Scott Shane, Critics of Ford’s Nixon Pardon Now Call It Wise, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
29, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/29/world/americas/29iht-pardon.4047202.html 
(recollecting Ford’s decision to pardon Richard Nixon). 
98. See Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and 
the Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 401–05 (1993) (reviewing Bush’s 
pardoning of his former colleagues from the Iran-Contra Affair). 
99. See Josh Gerstein, Clinton Pardon Records Offer Fuel for Hillary’s Foes, POLITICO 
(Jan. 28, 2016, 4:11 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/hillary-clinton-pardon-
record-218331 [https://perma.cc/ETR9-NBEX] (reviewing Clinton’s last-minute pardons, 
including one for his brother). 
100. See Andy Sullivan & Tabassum Zakaria, Bush Spares Libby from Prison, REUTERS 
(July 2, 2007, 5:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-libby-bush/bush-spares-
libby-from-prison-idUSWAT00783220070702 [https://perma.cc/298K-TFCC] (covering 
Bush’s commutation of Lewis Libby, former chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, who 
was sentenced for obstructing a CIA leak probe). 
101. See Catherine Rampell, Why Did Trump Pardon Arpaio?  Because He Sees Himself 
in the Former Sheriff, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/why-did-trump-pardon-arpaio-because-he-sees-himself-in-the-former-sheriff/2017/
08/28/26690608-8c2e-11e7-91d5-ab4e4bb76a3a_story.html?utm_term=.c3cfa6f0cfd0 
[https://perma.cc/CC3S-7SYM] (arguing that Trump pardoned Arpaio for various reasons 
including political support and loyalty). 
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to review the scope of the president’s pardon power, beginning with Ex 
parte Garland. 
F. Garland, the Supreme Court, and the Pardon Power 
Garland arose when Congress passed a law in 1865 preventing 
former Confederate officials from becoming licensed lawyers by requiring 
them to take a loyalty oath—one which affirmed they never voluntarily 
gave aid to the Confederacy: 
[N]o person shall be admitted as an attorney and counsellor to the bar 
of the Supreme Court . . . Circuit or District Court . . . or of the Court 
of Claims, or be allowed to appear and be heard by virtue of any 
previous admission, or any special power of attorney, unless he shall 
have first taken and subscribed the oath prescribed by the act . . . .  [I]f 
any person take it falsely he shall be guilty of perjury, and, upon 
conviction, shall be subject to the pains and penalties of that 
offence.102 
The oath prescribed by the act included: 
I . . . do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne 
arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that 
I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or 
encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I 
have neither sought nor accepted, not attempted to exercise the 
functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended 
authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a 
voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or 
constitution with the United States, hostile or inimical 
thereto. . . .  [S]o help me God.103 
Augustus Hill Garland was admitted to the bar in 1860 and began 
practicing law in Arkansas.104  When Arkansas seceded from the Union in 
1861, Garland remained in Arkansas to serve in both houses of the 
Confederate States Congress.105  After the Civil War ended, Arkansas 
rejoined the Union and in July 1865, Garland received a full pardon from 
President Andrew Johnson “for all offences committed by his 
participation, direct or implied, in the Rebellion.”106 
 
102. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 374–75 (1866). 
103. Id. at 334–35. 
104. Id. at 375. 
105. Id. at 374–75. 
106. Id. at 375. 
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Upon receiving the pardon, Garland sought to continue practicing as 
an attorney without taking the disqualifying oath, arguing the pardon 
exempted him from having to take the oath.107  When the case of Garland 
went before the Court, the issue “was whether the bar admission law 
passed by Congress infringed on the president’s pardon power.”108 
The Court answered this question by proclaiming the pardon is 
unlimited, with the exception of impeachment, as identified in the 
Constitution, and that the power cannot be interrupted or obstructed by 
Congress.109  Thus, the 1865 Act was held to be unconstitutional because 
it allowed Congress to subvert the president’s pardon power.110  The Court 
further held that Garland’s pardon was for all offenses relating to his prior 
Confederate allegiance; therefore, the pardon relieved him of all 
“penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason” and placed 
him “beyond the reach of punishment of any kind.”111  Because Garland 
was pardoned and unable to be punished, Congress could not preclude him 
from being admitted to the bar.112 
The Court reasoned that to prohibit Garland from his previously 
acquired right, that of practicing law, would be to allow a punishment 
despite Johnson’s pardon.113  Additionally, the Court stated that “[i]t is not 
within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment 
beyond the reach of executive clemency.”114 
Only four years passed after Garland before the Supreme Court again 
examined the reach of the presidential pardon.115  In United States v. Klein, 
the Court wrote, “[i]t is the intention of the Constitution that each of the 
great co-ordinate departments of the government . . . shall be, in its 
sphere, independent of the others.  To the executive alone is [en]trusted 
the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”116  Klein effectively 
 
107. Id. at 375–76. 
108. Ronald L. Goldfarb, No Premature Pardons, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 1987), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1987/12/08/no-premature-pardons/
6f0026e2-bc0a-4cf1-89c2-715d15422097/?utm_term=.5c3cd4982b39 [https://perma.cc/5F5G-
B7TG]. 
109. Garland, 71 U.S. at 371–73. 
110. See Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 19 Op. O.L.C. 160, 163 n.1 (1995), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/20206/download [https://perma.cc/5X6M-8UGF]. 
111. Garland, 71 U.S. at 381. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871). 
116. Id. 
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affirmed Garland’s bar against judicial or legislative interference with the 
pardon.117 
Garland set the stage for the next 150 years, a period in which the 
Court published seven important pardon-related opinions.118  The next 
section of this Note carefully parses these cases to argue that their 
collective opinions overrule the 1867 Garland decision. 
II. POST GARLAND JURISPRUDENCE LIMITS PARDON POWER 
The post-Garland, pardon-focused Supreme Court decisions had an 
impact on the president’s ability to exercise his Article II power.119  While 
none of these cases have expressly overruled the “unlimited” nature of the 
pardon power, several outlined a series of limits that—by their 
existence—collectively overrule Garland and Klein.120  This Part of the 
Note demonstrates how specific cases have limited the pardon to the point 
where Garland should no longer be considered good law. 
Garland itself was the first case that provided a limitation to the 
president’s pardon power.121  The Garland Court proclaimed—one 
paragraph after stating the pardon is unlimited—“[t]here is only this 
limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices forfeited, or property 
or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and 
judgment.”122  Therefore, within the same page as its primary holding, 
 
117. See Steiner, supra note 21, at 988. 
118. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[S]ome minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings.”); Conn. 
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“Unlike probation, pardon and 
commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are 
rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264–
65 (1974) (stating that a presidential pardon cannot offend other parts of the Constitution); Ex 
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 115, 120 (1925) (holding that criminal contempt of court 
constitutes an offense against the United States, and an offense against the United States is 
pardonable by the president); Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 87 (1915) (holding that a 
pardon must be accepted by the individual to whom it was issued in order to be valid); Knote v. 
United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) (holding that the presidential pardon cannot touch funds 
vested in the Treasury); Klein, 80 U.S. at 147 (1871) (reaffirming the unlimited holding in 
Garland). 
119. See, e.g., Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289; Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464; Schick, 419 U.S. at 
264; Burdick, 236 U.S. at 87; Knote, 95 U.S. at 154. 
120. See cases cited supra note 119. 
121. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380–81 (1866). 
122. Id. at 381 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *402); see 6 MATTHEW BACON, A 
NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 133–46 (7th ed. 1832) (“[I]n general, . . . the king may pardon 
any offence whatever, whether against the common or statute law, so far as the public is 
concerned in it, after it is over, and, consequently, may prevent a popular action on a statute, by 
pardoning the offence before the suit is commenced.”); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF 
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Garland immediately contradicts itself.  The difficulty with Garland’s 
limitation is that after citing a few sources,123 the Court fails to expound 
upon this limitation.124  The Garland Court did not provide any reasoning 
or justification as to why the president’s pardon power cannot restore 
offices or vested property.125  Despite the Court’s lack of explanation, the 
Garland limitation becomes more comprehensible when viewed in the 
context of Knote v. United States, where the Court held that pardons 
cannot take money from the treasury.126 
A. Presidential Pardons Cannot Involve the Withdrawal of Money from 
the United States Treasury 
In 1877, ten years after the Garland decision, the Supreme Court 
provided its first post-Garland limitation to the presidential pardon 
beyond impeachment: the president cannot issue a pardon that would 
involve the withdrawal of “[m]oneys once in the treasury.”127  Knote v. 
United States arose a few years after the Civil War, in the middle of 
Reconstruction, when President Andrew Johnson issued a general pardon 
by proclamation on December 25, 1868, “for the offence of treason 
against the United States, or of giving aid and comfort to their enemies, to 
all persons who had directly or indirectly participated in the rebellion.”128 
Knote claimed to own personal property in West Virginia that was 
seized by the United States government after he allegedly committed 
treason and rebellion.129  Upon seizure, Knote’s property was condemned, 
forfeited to the government, and sold for $11,000, and the money from the 
sale was then paid into the United States Treasury.130  Knote argued that 
because he was pardoned by President Johnson, he was “relieved of all 
disabilities and penalties attaching to the offence of treason and 
rebellion . . . and was restored to all his rights, privileges, and immunities 
under the Constitution . . . and thus became entitled to receive the said 
proceeds of [the property] sale.”131 
 
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT 
SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 529–52 (1824) (outlining the laws surrounding the 
pardon and its requirements incident to specific crimes). 
123. Garland, 71 U.S. at 381. 
124. See id. at 380–81. 
125. See id. 
126. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 152. 
129. Id. at 149. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 150. 
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In response to Knote’s claim, Justice Field provided a now-frequently 
cited description of what a pardon is: 
A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the 
consequences of his offence, so far as such release is practicable and 
within control of the pardoning power, or of officers under its 
direction.  It releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the 
offence, and restores to him all his civil rights.  In contemplation of 
law, it so far blots out the offence, that afterwards it cannot be imputed 
to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights.  It gives to him a new 
credit and capacity, and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former 
position. . . .  Neither does the pardon affect any rights which have 
vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for the 
offence, or which have been acquired by others whilst that judgment 
was in force.132 
Justice Field further stated that, with regard to the president’s pardon 
power, “there is this limit to it, as there is to all his powers,—it cannot 
touch moneys in the treasury . . . except expressly authorized 
by . . . Congress.  The Constitution places this restriction upon the 
pardoning power.”133 
Knote does not cite Garland except to mention that the pardon power 
has been subject to frequent review by the Court.134  While the Court does 
not embark on an extensive analysis as to the constitutionality of the 
pardon power, it still clearly prescribes a significant limitation.  The 
Court’s analysis dictates that the president’s ability to issue a pardon halts 
at the gates of the nation’s treasury, controlled and funded by the 
legislative branch, because the money became “vested” in the United 
States.135 
“Vested,” a term stemming from property law, is defined as “[h]aving 
become a completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; 
not contingent; unconditional; absolute.”136  Therefore, the Court’s ruling 
in Knote suggests that the limitation to the pardon relates to Congress’s 
vested property rights in the treasury.137  By providing that funds vested 
 
132. Id. at 153–54. 
133. Id. at 154. 
134. Id. at 153. 
135. 3 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 28:6 (3d ed. 
1996). 
136. Vested, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
137. Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886) (“[N]o pardon could . . . authorize the 
payment out of a general appropriation, of a debt which a law of congress had said should not 
be paid out of it.”); Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The 
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in the treasury can only be spent by Congress, the Court is indirectly 
providing a separation of powers justification for prescribing this 
limitation.138 
The Court reaffirmed Knote more recently in Office of Personnel 
Management v. Richmond, ruling that “[a]ny exercise of a power granted 
by the Constitution to one of the other branches of Government is limited 
by a valid reservation of congressional control over funds in the 
Treasury.”139  Office of Personnel Management did not directly deal with 
the presidential pardon, but, similar to Knote, it determined that another 
branch of government cannot instruct the removal of funds from the 
treasury.140 
The holdings in both Knote and Office of Personnel Management 
support the notion that “a pardon cannot interfere with the vested property 
rights of third parties in violation of the Takings Clause.  Second, a pardon 
cannot require the payment of funds from the Treasury in violation of the 
Spending Clause.”141  This language prohibiting the pardon’s interference 
with Congress’s Article I powers142 demonstrates a desire to protect the 
overall separation of powers.143  While respecting this fundamental design 
of our tripartite government, the Court held next that pardons must also be 
accepted by the pardonee in order to be valid.144 
B. Pardons Must Be Accepted by Receiver 
In 1915, the Court decided Burdick v. United States, invalidating a 
presidential pardon because the individual to whom it was issued refused 
the pardon.145  Burdick, a newspaper editor, appeared before a federal 
grand jury and, after asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, refused to 
 
Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 100 (1998) (“Of course, 
neither the President’s pardon power nor his foreign affairs responsibilities carries an authority 
to obligate the treasury.”). 
138. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146–48 (1871).  In Klein, the Court held that 
“the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can 
change a law.”  Id. at 148. 
139. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425 (1990). 
140. Office of Personnel Management involved an individual who claimed government 
incompetence prohibited him from obtaining disability benefits.  Id. at 417–18.  The Court held 
that, in conjunction with the Constitution, funds could only be dispersed from the treasury 
through Congress.  See id. at 425; Hart, 118 U.S. at 67. 
141. Hoffstadt, supra note 54, at 594 (internal citations omitted). 
142. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
143. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–77 (1803) (establishing judicial review by 
recognizing the separation of powers created by the Constitution). 
144. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 87 (1915). 
145. Id. 
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answer questions relating to a customs fraud investigation.146  He was set 
to reappear before the grand jury but instead received “a full and 
unconditional pardon for all offenses against the United States.”147  
President Woodrow Wilson issued this pardon in an effort to “eliminate 
the possibility of [Burdick’s] prosecution and thus frustrate [his] . . . claim 
of Fifth Amendment privilege.”148  Burdick rejected Wilson’s pardon, 
refused to answer questions about his sources, pled his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, and was fined and imprisoned for 
contempt of court.149 
Writing for the majority, Justice McKenna used the Court’s prior 
ruling in United States v. Wilson to reaffirm its holding that a pardon 
requires delivery, “and delivery is not complete without acceptance.  It 
may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be 
rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on him.”150  
Therefore, a presidential pardon does not automatically take effect once it 
is signed, sealed, and delivered. 
That a pardon by its mere issue has automatic effect resistless by him 
to whom it is tendered, forcing upon him by mere executive power 
whatever consequences it may have or however he may regard it, 
which seems to be the contention of the government in the case at bar, 
was rejected by the [Wilson] court with particularity and emphasis.151 
The Wilson Court explained that a pardon must be accepted to 
become effective because it must be plead by the pardonee.152  Therefore, 
 
146. Id. at 84–85. 
147. Id. at 86. 
148. Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 698, 702 (2012) [hereinafter Compelling Mercy]. 
149. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 41; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall [he] be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
150. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 90 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 161 (1833)).  
Wilson was charged with robbing the mail in Pennsylvania and threatening the mail carrier.  
Wilson, 32 U.S. at 150.  Wilson plead guilty, was convicted, and thereafter was sentenced to 
death.  Id. at 151.  President Andrew Jackson issued Wilson a pardon, one that Wilson ultimately 
refused and did not bring to the attention of the trial court.  Id. at 154.  The district attorney 
notified the trial court of the pardon, and when asked by the court if he had anything to say, 
Wilson answered “that he had nothing to say, and that he did not wish in any manner to avail 
himself, in order to avoid the sentence in this particular case, of the pardon referred to.”  Id. at 
158–59. 
151. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 90. 
152. Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160–61. 
It is the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the 
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the 
court.  It is a constituent part of the judicial system, that the judge sees only with 
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continuing its Wilson precedent, the Burdick Court held that “the pardon 
was legally issued . . . it was Burdick’s right to refuse it . . . therefore, [the 
pardon could not become] effective.”153  Thus, Wilson and Burdick limit 
the pardon in that it is not final until accepted.154  The ruling in Wilson was 
reaffirmed in other federal and state cases prior to Burdick.155 
Only ten years later, the issue of acceptance appeared before the 
Court again.  In Biddle v. Perovich, the petitioner was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to be hanged.156  In 1909, President William Howard Taft 
commuted Perovich’s death sentence to life in prison.157  Sixteen years 
later, Perovich filed for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his 
commutation, and subsequent transfers to various prisons, were done 
without consent or legal authority.158 
Upon reviewing Perovich’s request, the Court answered yes to the 
question: “Did the President have authority to commute the sentence of 
Perovich from death to life imprisonment?”159  Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes reasoned—by way of analogizing the pardon to the imposition of 
a judicial sentence—that, because the original punishment took effect 
without regard for the prisoner’s assent, the public welfare determines the 
final outcome when said punishment is altered.160 
What Justice Holmes encountered in Biddle was different than what 
Justice McKenna discussed in Burdick.  When an individual accepts a 
pardon, they also accept the implication of a confession of guilt;161 
 
judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular case, of which he is not 
informed judicially.  A private deed, not communicated to him, whatever may be 
its character, whether a pardon or release, is totally unknown, and cannot be acted 
on.  The looseness which would be introduced into judicial proceedings, would 
prove fatal to the great principles of justice, if the judge might notice and act upon 
facts not brought regularly into the cause.  Such a proceeding, in ordinary cases, 
would subvert the best established principles, and overturn those rules which have 
been settled by the wisdom of ages. 
Id. 
153. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 94. 
154. See id.; Wilson, 32 U.S. at 150. 
155. See, e.g., Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 315 (1855) (holding that the conditional 
pardon was accepted and thus valid); Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, 339 (1872) 
(“[I]t is within the election of the defendant whether he will avail himself of a pardon from the 
executive (be the pardon absolute or conditional) . . . .”). 
156. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485 (1927). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 486. 
160. Id. at 486–87. 
161. Steiner, supra note 21, at 971 n.90 (quoting United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 
958 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
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“whereas acceptance of a commutation involves no such admittance, so a 
commutation cannot be refused.”162  Therefore, while the ruling in Biddle 
might seem to have weakened Burdick’s holding, the Court simply 
decided not to extend Burdick.163 
Because the president’s pardoning power is conditioned upon 
acceptance, Wilson and Burdick further demonstrate that the presidential 
pardon is not without its limitations.164  To this day, the pardon granted in 
Burdick remains the only presidential pardon invalidated by the Court.165  
When deciding Burdick, the Court also believed Burdick’s pardon would 
undercut his ability to assert his Fifth Amendment right, thus offending 
another part of the Constitution—something neither the president nor the 
pardon can do.166 
C. Pardons Cannot Offend the Constitution 
In Burdick, the Court reasoned that by accepting a pardon, Burdick 
was placed in a position that essentially forced him to give up his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.167  With regard to the pardon 
and the Fifth Amendment, the Court believed its responsibility was “to 
preserve both [and] to leave to each its proper place,” so the pardon would 
 
Pardon implies guilt.  If there be no guilt, there is no ground for forgiveness.  It is 
an appeal to executive clemency.  It is asked as a matter of favor to the guilty.  It 
is granted not of right but of grace.  A party is acquitted on the ground of innocence; 
he is pardoned through favor. 
Id. 
162. Dan Jacoby, Not Unpardonable, DANJACOBY.COM (2009), 
http://www.danjacoby.com/politics/columns/writing/183_not_unpardonable.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XN6B-U4YG].  In a roundtable discussion conducted by ABC News, various 
legal scholars engaged in a conversation regarding the difference between a presidential pardon 
and commutation.  Commutation? Clemency? Pardon? Sorting Out Legalese in Libby Case, 
ABCNEWS (July 3, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3339765&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/3T9T-36G7].  Christopher Schroeder of Duke University stated that 
“[c]ommutations have always been a lesser included authority under president’s power to 
pardon.”  Id.  Randy Barnett of the Georgetown University Law Center stated “[p]ardon is an 
‘executive forgiveness of crime’; commutation is an ‘executive lowering of the penalty.’”  Id. 
163. Biddle, 274 U.S. at 487–88 (internal citation omitted) (“We are of opinion that the 
reasoning of [Burdick] is not to be extended to the present case.”). 
164. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 95 (1915); United States v. Wilson, 32 
U.S. 150, 150 (1833). 
165. See cases cited supra notes 7, 118, 150–52 and accompanying text (reviewing each 
case where the Court addressed the presidential pardon but rejected only one pardon: Burdick’s). 
166. See Burdick, 236 U.S. at 93–94. 
167. Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and the 
United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 105–06 (2002). 
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not offend other parts of the Constitution.168  Decades later, the Court 
continued this line of reasoning in Schick v. Reed.169 
The Schick Court held that “considerations of public 
policy . . . support an interpretation of [the pardon] power so as to permit 
the attachment of any condition which does not otherwise offend the 
Constitution.”170  Schick, the petitioner, was sentenced to death pursuant 
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for murder, only to receive a 
conditional presidential commutation lessening his sentence to life in 
prison.171  President Eisenhower’s commutation came with a steep price: 
Schick would only receive the commutation “on [the] condition that he 
never become eligible for parole.”172 
Schick challenged the validity of the commutation, arguing 
Eisenhower had exceeded his authority.173  Ultimately, the Court held the 
president could issue commutations and pardons that do not offend the 
Constitution.174  Without citing Garland or the “unlimited” power of the 
presidential pardon, the Schick Court ruled that “the pardoning power is 
an enumerated power of the Constitution and that its limitations, if any, 
must be found in the Constitution itself.”175  The Court did not believe the 
condition Eisenhower attached to Schick’s pardon in any way offended 
the Constitution.176  Indeed, conditional pardons were frequently used 
under the common law and the British monarchy.177  The history of the 
United States is replete with examples where the president issued 
conditional pardons.178 
 
168. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 93–94. 
169. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267–68 (1974). 
170. Id. at 266. 
171. Id. at 256. 
172. Samuel E. Schoenburg, Clemency, War Powers, and Guantánamo, 91 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 917, 927 n.74 (2016) (citing Schick, 419 U.S. at 257–59). 
173. Schick, 419 U.S. at 259–60. 
174. Id. at 266–67. 
175. Id. at 267. 
176. Schoenburg, supra note 172, at 928. 
177. See generally Patrick R. Cowlishaw, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. 
L. REV. 149, 150–57 (1975) (reviewing the history of pardons throughout England and the 
United States, including those with attached conditions). 
178. See David Gray Adler, The President’s Pardon Power, in INVENTING THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 209, 220 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989) (discussing how President 
Harding commuted the sentence of war radicals on the condition they be law-abiding, including 
the requirement that one travel to Washington D.C. to meet the President); Wresting the 
Pardoning Power, supra note 21, at 593 n.147 (citing 1 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 341 (1820)); Krent, 
supra note 59, at 1676–77 nn.69–75 (citing various instances where presidents have issued 
conditional pardons, particularly in the earlier years of the United States). 
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Contemporaneously with Schick, the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia adjudicated a case involving James “Jimmy” 
Hoffa and President Richard Nixon.179  President Nixon extended a 
commutation to Hoffa, conditioned upon his agreement not to engage, 
directly or indirectly, in union-related activities until the expiration of his 
original sentence.180  After accepting Nixon’s pardon, Hoffa argued that 
the Nixon’s restriction was too broad and implicated the First 
Amendment.181  In response, the court used a two-pronged analysis to 
determine whether the pardon was constitutional.182  In this analysis, the 
court declared that a president may not issue a conditional pardon or 
clemency that is not “directly related to the public interest” or that will 
“unreasonably infringe on the individual commutee’s constitutional 
freedoms.”183 
To arrive at its final decision, the court conducted an extensive 
constitutional analysis: 
Considered within the framework of our constitutional system, 
wherein the rights and liberties of the individual are accorded a 
position of paramount importance, there are obvious limits beyond 
which the President may not go in imposing and subsequently 
enforcing such conditions.  On the other hand, every condition which 
to some degree impinges on those rights and liberties is not thereby 
unenforceable.  Constitutional rights, including those First and Fifth 
Amendment rights raised by plaintiff, may be restricted provided that 
the restrictions are precisely drawn to accomplish a legitimate 
governmental purpose.184 
The court also considered an amicus brief by the American Civil Liberties 
Union, which argued that “a condition requiring the commutee to forego 
supporting any candidate for political office, except the President who 
commuted his sentence,” would be unconstitutional.185 
Employing the two-pronged analysis, the district court held that the 
president had constitutional authority to act as he did because the 
 
179. Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (D.D.C. 1974). 
180. Cowlishaw, supra note 177, at 154–55. 
181. See Krent, supra note 59, at 1714–15. 
182. Hoffa, 378 F. Supp. at 1236. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 1234–35 (citations omitted). 
185. Id. at 1235 n.48 (“We fully agree that such a condition would be unenforceable and 
would clearly fail to meet the standards . . . set forth infra.”). 
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banishment condition was reasonable in light of the fact that Hoffa’s 
crimes related to his leadership of the trade union.186 
Notwithstanding the fact that Schick and Hoffa fail to provide 
holdings on behavior that would be offensive to the Constitution, the 
Court’s rule stands: “[I]n at least some circumstances, conditions imposed 
on a grant of clemency could violate the Constitution and be subject to 
invalidation by the judiciary.”187  It is difficult to identify what the Court 
would specifically recognize as constitutionally offensive behavior 
because there is a lack of actual litigation on the matter, and United States 
jurisprudence regarding the presidential pardon is, overall, very limited.188  
However, a number of scholarly works have identified offensive behavior 
that would frustrate constitutional limits and require judicial review.189 
One argument suggests pardons implicating “cruel and unusual 
punishment[s] could not be imposed as a condition, even if the alternative, 
e.g., death, might have been viewed as even less desirable by the would-
be pardonee.”190  Despite the fact that judicial interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment 
continues to evolve,191 Harold Krent argues that a pardon containing such 
a punishment would offend the Constitution and require judicial 
intervention, as would pardons that affect freedom of speech or religious 
 
186. Boudin, supra note 21, at 22; see also Hoffa, 378 F. Supp. at 1235. 
[I]t would be unrealistic to consider the restriction placed on plaintiff Hoffa’s 
commutation except in the context of his status as a felon twice convicted for 
activities arising out of his union office and serving a combined sentence of 
thirteen years imprisonment.  This point of reference is significant to the decision 
of the instant case because Hoffa’s “[constitutional] rights of necessity are 
conditioned by the situation in which [his] convictions placed [him].” 
Id. (quoting Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).  Hoffa submitted an appeal 
that was later dismissed due to his disappearance and presumed death.  Of Pardons, Politics and 
Collar Buttons, supra note 87, at 1488 n.19. 
187. Compelling Mercy, supra note 148, at 716. 
188. See generally Executive Clemency, supra note 82 (discussing the history of the 
presidential pardon power). 
189. See Compelling Mercy, supra note 148, at 701 (arguing pardons that deny 
fundamental rights would offend the Constitution); Krent, supra note 59, at 1693 (contending 
that pardons that result in cruel and unusual punishments would offend the Constitution); 
Strasser, supra note 167, at 115 (averring that castration, as a prerequisite to receiving a pardon, 
would constitute a cruel and unusual punishment). 
190. Strasser, supra note 167, at 115; see also Avital Stadler, Comment, California Injects 
New Life into an Old Idea: Taking a Shot at Recidivism, Chemical Castration, and the 
Constitution, 46 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1322 (1997) (“There is little question that actual castration 
would be considered a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
191. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  The Eighth Amendment standard 
constantly changes and “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Id. 
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practice.192  Daniel Kobil argues that presidential pardons and clemencies 
could offend the Constitution if they were to undermine fundamental 
rights, deny equal protection of the law, deny due process, or be granted 
in cases of impeachment.193 
These are all areas of constitutional law for which the Court has 
identified as so important that they require a heightened level of scrutiny 
to determine the validity of government action.194  For example, if a 
presidential pardon were issued upon the condition that a pardonee be 
sterilized, the Court’s ruling in Skinner v. Oklahoma may stand in the 
president’s way or, at the very least, invoke judicial review.195  Similarly, 
if the president were to issue a pardon upon the condition that an 
individual not engage in a same-sex marriage, the Court’s ruling in 
Obergefell v. Hodges may ignite a judicial response similar to if a state 
were to pass legislation, once again, banning same-sex marriage.196 
Skinner and Obergefell represent a large area of jurisprudence that 
involves overturning government action interfering with individuals’ 
fundamental rights.197  If the Court would strike down laws that severely 
hinder an individual’s enjoyment of certain rights as violative of the 
Constitution—whether they be fundamental or any other—then similar 
actions taken by the president should provoke the same judicial response 
and protections.198 
 
192. Krent, supra note 59, at 1692–94. 
193. See Compelling Mercy, supra note 148, at 712–28 (arguing that such pardons are 
actions that would offend the Constitution, are subject to judicial review, and should be 
overturned by the Supreme Court). 
194. See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg’s Charge That the Constitution is 
“Skimpy” in Comparison to Our International Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental 
Rights in American and Foreign Law, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 951, 954–55 (1998). 
195. See Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–43 (1942) 
(recognizing that procreation is a fundamental right requiring a strict scrutiny analysis if 
government action were taken to hinder the right). 
196. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“The right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived 
of that right and that liberty.”). 
197. See id.; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 
(1972) (holding that parents have a fundamental right to the custody of their children and 
revocation of said right requires an individualized hearing to determine fitness; overruling law 
that automatically revoked unwed father’s custody of children upon death of the mother); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that marriage is a fundamental right and the 
law banning interracial marriage was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection 
clause). 
198. See cases cited supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
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The Court in Schick limited the presidential pardon to the extent that 
it may not offend other parts of the Constitution.199  Therefore, Schick 
furthers the central argument of this Note—that there are limitations to the 
pardon power, those limitations exist in the Constitution,200 and there may 
be others not yet identified or explored.  As a result, the Court must 
recognize and effectuate its ability to review constitutionally questionable 
pardons, a power that one former Justice recognized and herself 
addressed.201 
D. Procedural Safeguards Apply and the Supreme Court Can Intervene 
In one of its first cases, the Supreme Court demonstrated its primary 
power in our tripartite government when it invalidated a law through the 
exercise of judicial review.202  In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John 
Marshall wrote the unanimous decision that included the following 
language: 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must 
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with 
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 
. . . . 
 The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases 
arising under the constitution.203 
Two centuries later, Marbury remains the primary authority upon which 
the Court recognizes its power to review cases—a power derived from the 
language and structure of the Constitution.204 
The ruling in Marbury is what empowered the Court to hear and 
ultimately adjudicate the decision in Ex parte Garland, the case where the 
Court defined the pardon’s scope.205  Despite the Court’s proscription 
against judicial intervention with the pardon,206 if the Court did not believe 
 
199. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1974). 
200. Id. 
201. See infra Section II.D. 
202. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (reviewing the Court’s role in 
deciding the law and establishing judicial review). 
203. Id. at 177–78. 
204. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO: 
Some Similarities and Differences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 587, 589 (2004) (“The power 
to nullify legislative acts that exceed the constitutional powers of the federal government is, of 
course, the type of judicial review later affirmed in Marbury v. Madison.”). 
205. See supra Section I.F. 
206. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871). 
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it had the authority to review the presidential pardon, it most likely would 
have denied certiorari to Garland’s appeal, as well as the several other 
pardon-related cases thereafter.207  However, the Court heard Garland, 
followed by Klein, Knote, Burdick, Biddle, Schick, Dumschat, and—most 
recently—Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard.208  The split opinions 
provided in Woodard demonstrate—and possibly forecast—the evolving 
legal landscape upon which the Court will now traverse when adjudicating 
decisions involving the pardon.209 
In Woodard, the official opinion of the Court rests in Parts I and III 
of the decision, with a plurality opinion in Part II.210  The Woodard Court 
provided two important yet conflicting notions.211  First, the Court 
reaffirmed that “pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally 
been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate 
subjects for judicial review.”212  Second—and what makes Woodard 
unique and important to the argument of this Note—is not the majority 
decision, rather the concurrence provided by Justice O’Connor in which 
she states: 
I do not, however, agree . . . that, because clemency is committed to 
the discretion of the executive, the Due Process Clause provides no 
constitutional safeguards. . . .  [S]ome minimal procedural safeguards 
apply to clemency proceedings.  Judicial intervention might . . . be 
warranted in . . . a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to 
determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State 
arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.213 
 
207. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288–89 (1998) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (highlighting situations where it may be appropriate for the Court to review a 
presidential pardon); see also Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae Martin Redish, 
Free Speech for People and Coalition to Preserve, Protect and Defend in Opposition to Motion 
of Defendant Joseph Arpaio for Vacatur and Dismissal with Prejudice at 5–6, United States v. 
Arpaio, 2:16-cr-01012 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2017), BL No. 227 [hereinafter Redish]. 
[I]n neither Burdick nor Biddle did the Court decline to exercise its role as final 
arbiter of the pardon power’s scope on the ground that the power is absolute. 
 Together, these cases teach that courts limit the President’s pardon power 
where, and only where, competing constitutional rights are at stake. 
Id. 
208. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also supra Section I.F. 
209. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 276 (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons vs. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)). 
213. Id. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (second emphasis added). 
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The crux of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is that an executive 
pardon could be reviewed by the courts if the pardon implicates due 
process concerns or is arbitrarily implemented.214  She, too, argues that the 
pardon cannot offend other parts of the Constitution.215  While this was 
not the official opinion of the Court in Woodard, it demonstrates a 
potential shift in the Court’s most recent jurisprudence: not only is the 
pardon power limited in some capacity, it is appropriate for the Court to 
step in and exercise judicial review.216  From 1998 onward, several federal 
circuits have directly cited Justice O’Connor’s concurrence while 
recognizing that some clemency procedures do require some form of due 
process.217 
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence and partial dissent, agreed with 
Justice O’Connor when he wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause does apply to matters relating to clemency.218  Specifically, 
Justice Stevens wrote: 
There are valid reasons for concluding that even if due process is 
required in clemency proceedings, only the most basic elements of fair 
procedure are required.  Presumably a State might eliminate this aspect 
of capital sentencing entirely, and it unquestionably may allow the 
executive virtually unfettered discretion in determining the merits of 
appeals for mercy.  Nevertheless, there are equally valid reasons for 
concluding that these proceedings are not entirely exempt from 
judicial review. . . .  [N]o one would contend that [an executive] could 
ignore the commands of the Equal Protection Clause and use race, 
religion, or political affiliation as a standard for granting or denying 
clemency.  Our cases also support the conclusion that if a State adopts 
a clemency procedure as an integral part of its system for finally 
determining whether to deprive a person of life, that procedure must 
comport with the Due Process Clause.219 
 
214. Id. at 289. 
215. See supra Section II.C. 
216. See Daniel T. Kobil, Should Clemency Decisions Be Subject to a Reasons 
Requirement, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 150, 152 & n.20 (2001) (citing Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289–
90). 
217. See Lee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2017); Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 
1306, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2013); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 313–14 (4th Cir. 2002); Wilson 
v. United States Dist. Court, 161 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1998); Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 
1058, 1060–61 (10th Cir. 1998). 
218. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
219. Id. 
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Justice Stevens’ opinion is primarily about the clemency power 
vested in the Governor of Ohio.220  However, Chief Justice Rehnquist—
the author of the Court’s opinion—and Justices O’Connor and Stevens all 
discuss broadly the ability of the Court to interfere with or review issues 
pertaining to clemencies and pardons.221 
In Part II of Woodard, “Chief Justice Rehnquist . . . would have ruled 
that clemency, as a matter of ‘grace’ rather than a legitimate claim of 
entitlement, is not subject to judicial review for alleged violations of due 
process.”222  However, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, coupled 
together with that of Justice Stevens, shows that “a majority of the 
Supreme Court has not embraced such a ‘hands off’ approach to judicial 
involvement in clemency matters.”223  Therefore, the Woodard decision 
did not rule out due process arguments relating to the constitutionality of 
executive clemency, leaving “the door open to future challenges” to the 
pardon’s scope.224 
Leaving “the door open” to litigation represents a dramatic shift from 
the Court’s original Garland decision.225  Therefore, if Arpaio’s case 
continues to include the validity of his pardon, and makes its way to the 
Supreme Court, the Court has the responsibility to reevaluate Garland.  
That is to say, the Court must proclaim Garland to be bad law in 
accordance with its aforementioned case law, collectively demonstrating 
that the president’s power to pardon is not unlimited.226 
E. Current Limitations that Apply to the Presidential Pardon 
This Note agrees with the aforementioned jurisprudence and 
scholarship discussed throughout Part II, that the president’s pardon is 
constrained—but not exclusively—by the following limitations.227 
First, pardons cannot interfere with the separation of powers in our 
tripartite government; for example, a pardon cannot remove funds from 
the treasury because it would interfere with Congress’s Article I 
 
220. See Strasser, supra note 167, at 129–30. 
221. Id. 
222. Compelling Mercy, supra note 148, at 700 (citing Woodard, 523 U.S. at 284–85). 
223. Id. at 701. 
224. Matthew B. Meehan, A Gathering Storm: Future Challenges Necessitate Reform of 
Arizona’s Dysfunctional Post-Conviction Regime, 9 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 1, 24 (2016). 
225. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
226. See cases cited supra notes 7, 118, 150–52 and accompanying text (identifying each 
case where the Court provided a limit to the president’s pardon power). 
227. Supra Part II. 
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powers.228  Second, pardons must be accepted to be valid.229  Third, 
pardons cannot offend the Constitution, such as interfering with an 
individual’s First or Fifth Amendment rights or their fundamental 
rights.230  Fourth, pardons and clemencies are subject to procedural due 
process.231  Fifth, and finally, pardons are always reviewable by the 
Supreme Court, who is empowered to “say what the law is.”232 
While the Court has been careful not to wade into the waters of the 
president’s pardon power, it can no longer afford to stand idly by.  In 
addition to implicitly restricting Garland by its subsequent opinions that 
limit the president’s pardon power, the Court has impliedly recognized it 
has a significant role to play in the pardon process overall.233  Stemming 
from its ruling in Marbury, the Court is the only entity capable of 
reviewing executive or legislative action to determine if it falls within the 
confines of the Constitution,234 and it must do so now with the presidential 
pardon.  The notion that the president can exercise a plenary power 
unchecked by another branch is contrary to the ideals of the balance and 
separation of powers.235  Therefore, when the Court reviews the 
president’s power to issue pardons, it must do so with an eye towards 
creating a new precedent that more accurately states the pardon’s scope 
and better protects the Court’s overall role and authority in our 
government. 
Because so much of the discussion involving the presidential pardon 
invokes matters relating to the balance of powers, the next section 
contextualizes Garland and the pardon within the larger separation of 
powers debate. 
 
 
 
 
228. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877); see Garland, 71 U.S. at 380–81. 
229. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 87–93 (1915); United States v. Wilson, 
32 U.S. 150, 161 (1833). 
230. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264 (1974); Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1234–
35 (D.D.C. 1974); Compelling Mercy, supra note 148, at 716; Krent, supra note 59, at 1693; 
see also Redish, supra note 207, at 6 (“[C]ourts limit the President’s pardon power 
where . . . competing constitutional rights are at stake.”). 
231. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288–90 (1998) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); Compelling Mercy, supra note 148, at 701. 
232. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
233. See supra notes 229–32. 
234. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
235. See infra Part III. 
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III. CONTEXTUALIZING GARLAND, CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND THE 
PARDON 
President Trump’s pardoning of Arpaio’s contempt of court 
conviction reignited a centuries old separation of powers dispute between 
the executive and judicial branches of government.236  The United States 
jurisprudence addressing separation of powers began with Marbury v. 
Madison.237  The Garland court continued that jurisprudence when it ruled 
the pardon was an unlimited power of the president.238 
Traditionally, the judicial branch has utilized contempt of court as a 
means to punish those who fail to comply with a court order.239  The 
Supreme Court has described contempt of court as “[t]he ability to punish 
disobedience to judicial orders [and] is regarded as essential to ensuring 
that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority.”240  While 
contempt of court is not enumerated in the Constitution, it is seen as an 
inherent power of the judicial branch.241  The Court itself has stated “[t]hat 
the power to punish for contempt[] is inherent in all courts, has been many 
times decided and may be regarded as settled law.”242  In Young v. United 
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the Court held that contempt was 
essential to its administration of justice and “may not be left to the mercy 
of the Executive Branch.”243  A contempt of court conviction constitutes 
“an offense against the United States” and thus is pardonable by the 
president.244 
 
236. See Brief of Amici Curiae Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael E. Tigar, and Jane B. Tigar 
Supporting Denial of Vacatur at 15–18, United States v. Arpaio, No. 17-10448 (9th Cir. Dec. 
21, 2017), BL No. 18-2 [hereinafter Chemerinsky et al.] (reviewing the history of the separation 
of powers debate).  The Constitution grants the president power to pardon “[o]ffenses against 
the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
237. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–77 (1803).  “By the constitution 
of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the 
exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his 
political character, and to his own conscience.”  Id. at 166.  “The powers of the legislature are 
defined, and limited . . . .”  Id. at 176.  “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”  Id. at 177. 
238. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). 
239. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 
U.S. 324, 327 (1904). 
240. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987). 
241. Protect Democracy Project, supra note 5, at 3. 
242. Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. 
Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924). 
243. Protect Democracy Project, supra note 5, at 12 (citing Michaelson, 266 U.S at 65–
66). 
244. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 115. 
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Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Grossman, some view a 
court’s ability to issue a contempt conviction, and imprison an individual 
for said conviction, as the only mechanism in which the judicial branch is 
able to uphold its power against the other branches.245  Others have 
described the judiciary’s ability to punish contempt violations as its “most 
important duty: [in order] to act as a ‘counter-majoritarian’ check on 
excesses threatened or committed by the coordinate branches of 
government.”246  Without protecting contempt sanctions “[court] orders 
would have little practical force, and would be rendered essentially 
meaningless.”247  If parties can interfere with contempt orders “then are 
the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls the 
‘judicial power of the United States’ would be a mere mockery.”248 
Despite the history regarding the president’s ability to pardon 
contempt charges, the national, scholarly, and legal debate on the pardon 
should turn to its limitations.249  Without recognizing that the pardon is a 
limited presidential power and that the Supreme Court is empowered to 
review the president’s exercise of that power, the Court diminishes its 
ability to “say what the law is,”250 thus threatening the continuity of the 
balance and separation of powers.  The creation of a new precedent would 
better protect the separation of powers and the Court’s authority overall. 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1867, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions that 
collectively limit the reach of the presidential pardon, thus overruling its 
holding in Ex parte Garland that the pardon is unlimited.  Despite 
outlining decisions to the contrary, the Court has not specifically said the 
president’s pardon authority is limited.251  However, through Klein, Knote, 
Burdick, Wilson, Schick, Dumschat, and Woodard, the Court has 
 
Nothing in the ordinary meaning of the words “offenses against the United States” 
excludes criminal contempts.  That which violates the dignity and authority of 
federal courts such as an intentional effort to defeat their decrees justifying 
punishment violates a law of the United States, and so must be an offense against 
the United States. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
245. See Roderick, supra note 5, at 3. 
246. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 236, at 9. 
247. Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 774 F.3d 935, 952 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
248. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). 
249. See supra Part II. 
250. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–77 (1803). 
251. See supra Section II.E. 
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effectively limited the president’s ability to exercise the pardon power by 
prohibiting pardons from withdrawing funds vested in third parties, 
pardons not accepted by receiver, and pardons that offend the 
Constitution.252 
Although some may object to overruling Garland based on its long-
standing precedent, the Court has written that “stare decisis is a principle 
of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest 
decision.”253  In the last two centuries, the Court has demonstrated a 
willingness to overrule its own precedents254—it has done so over two 
hundred times.255  Because the Court has overruled itself many times 
before, it can and should do so now with Garland by proclaiming it to be 
bad law and unworkable in today’s jurisprudence. 
It is time for the Supreme Court, to review the 150-year jurisprudence 
involving the presidential pardon and finally declare: (1) Garland is 
overruled; (2) the presidential pardon is limited; and (3) a new 
interpretation of the pardon’s scope is necessary.  By sticking to its 1867 
ruling, the Court is upholding bad law, while limiting its ability to protect 
itself, preserve its power, and remain an effective, coequal branch in the 
United States government. 
 
252. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998); Conn. Bd. of 
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 265–66 (1981); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264 (1974); 
Burdick v. United States 236 U.S. 79, 87 (1915); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 
(1877); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 
160–61 (1833). 
253. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). 
254. See U.S. GOV’T PUBLISHING OFFICE, SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OVERRULED BY 
SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS 2385 (2002), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-
2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC4Y-4E57]; see also Albert P. 
Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, “Overruling” Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 
151, 184–94 (1958). 
255. U.S. GOV’T PUBLISHING OFFICE, supra note 254, at 2399.  Some well-known and 
noteworthy examples of when the Court overruled itself include Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
Mapp v. Ohio, and Brown v. Board of Education.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) by holding plaintiffs must include 
sufficient facts in their complaint to make it plausible, not just possible or conceivable, they will 
be able to prove facts to support their claims); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) 
(overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) by holding evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment may not be used in state criminal proceedings); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) by holding that 
separate but equal “segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws” and thus 
unconstitutional). 
